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THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING:
A NEO-BLACKSTONIAN CRITIQUE
SAUL CORNELL*
The emergence of a new variant of constitutional originalism has
been heralded by its supporters as a major step forward in constitu-
tional theory.  The new originalism claims to have met the profound
objections leveled at earlier versions of this theory by shifting atten-
tion away from a focus on the subjective belief of the Framers of the
Constitution.1  Rather than concentrate on original intent, this “new”
method focuses on the plain meaning the text would have had to
Americans at the time it was adopted.2  Randy Barnett, one of the
leading partisans of this method, describes it as follows: “In constitu-
tional interpretation, the shift is from the original intentions, or will
of the lawmakers, to the objective original meaning that a reasonable
listener would have placed on the words used in the constitutional
provision at the time of its enactment.”3  Ironically, this new variant of
originalism may be at odds with the dominant modes of constitutional
interpretation in place at the time the Constitution was debated and
ratified.4  This new theory is also subject to challenge on methodologi-
cal grounds as well.  The methods of original meaning originalism ig-
nore many of the most basic rules of historical inquiry.  In essence, the
“new” originalism is really nothing more than the old law- office his-
tory under a new guise.5
Copyright  2007 by Saul Cornell.
* Professor of History, Ohio State University, and Director of the Second Amend-
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1. Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 620 (1999);
Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 609 (2004).
2. Whittington, supra note 1, at 609. R
3. Barnett, supra note 1, at 621. R
4. See discussion infra Part I.
5. The debate on originalism as a method for constitutional interpretation is im-
mense. See generally JACK N. RAKOVE, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER
ORIGINAL INTENT (1990).  For overviews of the debate, see Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism
Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085 (1989); Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the
Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L.
REV. 226 (1988).  A detailed philosophical discussion of originalism may be found in KEITH
E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1999).  For the most recent attempt to
defend this methodology, see Barnett, supra note 1, at 613; Randy E. Barnett, The Original R
Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101, 105–08 (2001).  For another recent
150
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While it is beyond the scope of a short essay to fully explore the
range of interpretive practices in place at the time the Constitution
was first proposed and ratified, there is good reason to doubt that
plain-meaning originalism is a historically accurate reflection of how
many contemporaries would have interpreted the Constitution.6  Simi-
larly, a brief comment could not possibly catalogue all of the method-
ological problems in plain-meaning originalism.7  These caveats aside,
it is easy to expose some of the more glaring problems with plain-
meaning originalism as an interpretive practice.
I. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE AND THE FOUNDING ERA’S COMMITMENT TO
CONTEXTUALISM
One important strain within the founding generation’s constitu-
tionalism was deeply contextualist in approach and in many respects
antithetical to plain-meaning originalism.8  The irony at the core of
plain-meaning originalism is easily discernible if one examines the
writings of Sir William Blackstone, one of the leading jurisprudential
thinkers in the eighteenth-century Anglo-American world.  Although
Blackstone’s methods were never hegemonic in the founding era, his
influence was profound.9  Clear echoes of Blackstonian modes of con-
stitutional interpretation are evident in sources contemporaneous
with the ratification of the Constitution.10  Although his influence
waned somewhat in the decades after ratification, there is equally
strong evidence that many of his rules of interpretation continued to
shape the way lawyers, judges, and legislators approached constitu-
tional texts well into the Civil War era.11
endorsement of this method, see John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Symmetric
Entrenchment: A Constitutional and Normative Theory, 89 VA. L. REV. 385, 391 (2003).  On the
notion of standards for originalists, see H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L.
REV. 659 (1987).  For trenchant critiques of this method and its lack of historical sophisti-
cation, see Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM.
L. REV. 523, 523–29 (1995); Larry D. Kramer, When Lawyers Do History, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 387 (2003); Mark Tushnet, Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship: The Case of History-in-Law,
71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 909, 913–14 (1996).
6. See discussion infra Part I.
7. One useful starting place is Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70
U. CHI. L. REV. 519 (2003).  On the Founders’ views of the matter, see Charles A. Lofgren,
The Original Understanding of Original Intent?, 5 CONST. COMMENT. 77 (1988); H. Jefferson
Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985).
8. See, e.g., DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE LAW 128 (1958).
9. On Blackstone’s influence, see Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U.
PA. L. REV. 1 (1996).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 21–43.
11. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 9, at 7. R
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Although Blackstone’s Toryism caused him to be the object of
some hostility in the post-revolutionary era, his Commentaries on the
Laws of England remained an important influence on early-American
constitutional and legal thought.12  For those who consulted Black-
stone for guidance on legal matters, the English jurist provided clear
rules for interpreting legal texts.13  At first glance, Blackstone’s rules
seem to vindicate the methodological approach of plain-meaning
originalism.  The learned judge noted that “[w]ords are generally to
be understood in their usual and most known signification.”14  While
this method would seem to support the methods of plain-meaning
originalism, this was only one of several steps necessary to discern the
true meaning of a legal text.  Blackstone noted an important excep-
tion to this general rule in cases where the words at issue were terms
of art, or technical terms, in which case, he noted, they “must be taken
according to the acceptation of the learned in each art, trade, and
science.”15  Thus, plain meaning was not always the meaning to be
sought when interpreting legal and constitutional texts.  Even more
important than these two guidelines was another paramount interpre-
tive rule that trumped both of these considerations: “the most univer-
sal and effectual way of discovering the true meaning of a law,”
Blackstone declared, was to inquire into “the reason and spirit of it; or
the cause which moved the legislator to enact it.”16  According to this
method, the meaning of a specific constitutional provision was to be
gleaned from its immediate historical context.  Specifically, one had
to discover the evil a provision was intended to remedy.  Context is
generally given short shrift in plain-meaning originalism which is
deeply anti-contextualist in approach.17  While the constitutional his-
torian’s credo is usually the more context, the better, the opposite is
true for plain-meaning originalists.18  “[M]ore ‘historical context,’”
Barnett claims “is not automatically preferred.”19  In his view, too
much attention to context “may instead cloud what was otherwise a
fairly clear meaning.”20  While plain-meaning originalists might find
context inconvenient, the same was not true for the founding genera-
12. ALLAN C. GUELZO, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: REDEEMER PRESIDENT 77 (1999); WILLARD
STERNE RANDALL, THOMAS JEFFERSON: A LIFE 109 (1993).
13. 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES 59–61 (1803).
14. Id. at 59.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 61 (emphasis omitted).
17. Barnett, supra note 5, at 107. R
18. Flaherty, supra note 5, at 550. R
19. Barnett, supra note 5, at 107.
20. Id.
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tion.  Rather than simply seek the plain meaning of the text, the Foun-
ders—at least those who took their cues from Blackstone—were
deeply concerned with the context that gave rise to specific constitu-
tional provisions.  Rather than lead away from context, the original
understanding of originalism leads back to rigorous contextualism.
Sorting out how pervasive Blackstone’s theories of constitutional
construction were in the era of the Constitution is itself an enor-
mously complex historical question.  Yet, there are tantalizing sugges-
tions that Blackstone’s methodology had permeated significant parts
of American legal culture and even spilled over into popular culture
as well.  One good place to discover the prevalence of Blackstonianism
is  in the popular press. Consider the lively debate between two pseu-
donymous writers, “Scribble Scrabble” and “Senex,” who discussed the
meaning of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 during the winter
of 1786–87.21  One of the issues that attracted their notice was the
meaning of the right to keep and bear arms.  One of the two, adopt-
ing the Roman persona of Senex, argued that constitutional protec-
tion for the right to bear arms was limited by the purpose of the
provision, which was to provide for the common defense.22  Following
Blackstonian modes of construction Senex reminded his audience
that in “defining this article, we ought to consider the evil intended to
be remedied.”23  In Senex’s view, the right to bear arms was included
in the Massachusetts Constitution as a means of preventing the dis-
armament of the militia.  As Senex noted, “[t]he idea, that Great
Britain meant to take away their arms, was fresh in the minds of the
people.”24  The march of British regulars on Concord that triggered
the shot heard around the world, it is worth recalling, was aimed at
crippling the militia by seizing its gun powder, which was stored at a
public magazine.25  As one contemporary historian recalled, “orders
were issued to the provincial governors to deprive the people of the
means of resistance.”26  A similar account was penned by another rev-
olutionary-era historian who noted that the British targeted “powder
21. Senex, CUMB. GAZETTE (Portland), Jan. 12, 1787; Scribble Scrabble, CUMB. GAZETTE
(Portland), Dec. 8, 1786 & Jan. 26, 1787.  Maine was still part of Massachusetts at this time.
22. Senex, supra note 21. R
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. ROBERT MIDDLEKAUF, THE GLORIOUS CAUSE: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION,
1763–1789, at 266–67 (1982).
26. J.W. CAMPBELL, A HISTORY OF VIRGINIA FROM ITS DISCOVERY TILL THE YEAR 1781, at
154 (1813).
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and warlike stores.”27  During the congressional debate over the Sec-
ond Amendment, Elbridge Gerry made a similar point.  Gerry re-
minded his fellow congressmen that the British had “used every
means in their power to prevent the establishment of an effective mili-
tia.”  Gerry’s comments did not address the right of individual self-
defense or the right to hunt; his comments reflected the widespread
concern that the British had been engaged in a systematic attempt to
disarm the militia and cripple America’s capacity for collective self-
defense.28
Neither the debate between Scribble Scrabble and Senex, nor El-
bridge Gerry’s important speech in Congress, supports the claims of
gun rights originalists who insist that the right to bear arms was gener-
ally understood to include both the private right of personal self-de-
fense and the public right of collective self-defense.  The right of
individual self-defense was well grounded in common law, and noth-
ing the British did during the Revolution deprived Americans of this
right.  British policy aimed to disarm the militia and undermine col-
lective self-defense.29  Given these facts, there would have been little
need to carve out an explicit protection for the right of individual self-
defense or a general right to hunt.  Scribble Scrabble addressed this
issue directly and noted that the constitutional right to keep and bear
arms aimed to guard “the people’s right to keep and bear arms for a
particular purpose” which “is secured to them against any future acts
of the legislature.”30  For this writer, the militia focus of this provision
was unmistakable.  The personal right to use arms, however, was an-
other matter entirely.  As far as this author was concerned, “the legisla-
ture have a power to control it in all cases, except the one mentioned
in the bill of rights, whenever they shall think the good of the whole
require it.”31  Echoing a broader view familiar to the Founders, Scrib-
ble Scrabble noted that the private use of firearms was legally distinct
from uses connected to the militia and hence ought to be governed by
different legal standards.32  Civilian uses of firearms, including the
27. 1 MERCY OTIS WARREN, HISTORY OF THE RISE, PROGRESS AND TERMINATION OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 101 (1988).  This useful modern edition of Warren’s early history of
the Revolution provides an excellent illustration of the strongly civic republican character
of American culture in the founding era.
28. Elbridge Gerry, Remarks at the U.S. House of Representatives (Aug. 17, 1789), in
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS 182 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991).
29. SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA 13 (2006) [hereinafter A WELL REGU-
LATED MILITIA].
30. Scribble Scrabble, supra note 21. R
31. Id.
32. Id.  Although the Founders did not frame constitutional issues in terms of modern
theories of judicial scrutiny, their approach to gun regulation appears consistent with mod-
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common law right of self-defense, were subject to regulation in accor-
dance with the state’s ample police powers.33  Senex and Scribble
Scrabble each approached the Massachusetts Constitution’s arms-
bearing provision in a manner consistent with the mode of legal con-
struction described by Blackstone.  The constitutional protection for
this particular use had to be interpreted with its original purpose in
mind, i.e., common defense.  Neither of these newspaper essayists
questioned the accepted belief that bearing arms within the militia
was different than bearing a gun in self-defense or for hunting.  The
use of firearms in connection with militia service, however, was ex-
pressly protected by the Constitution and was entitled to a higher level
of constitutional protection.34
Additional evidence about the original understanding of the
right to bear arms can be gleaned from textual and structural analy-
sis.35  Blackstone’s rules of construction also included the following
guidelines:
If words happen to be still dubious, we may establish their
meaning from the context; with which it may be of singular
use to compare a word, or a sentence, whenever they are am-
biguous, equivocal, or intricate.  Thus the proeme, or pream-
ble, is often called in to help the construction of an act of
parliament.  Of the same nature and use is the comparison
of a law with other laws, that are made by the same legislator,
that have some affinity with the subject, or that expressly re-
late to the same point.36
ern theories of rational basis review.  On the long tradition of using rational basis review in
firearms regulation in modern American law, see Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second
Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 686–87 (2007) (“[T]he courts of every state to consider
[an individual’s right to bear arms] apply a deferential ‘reasonable regulation’ standard.”).
33. For a detailed discussion of the difference between these two legal ideals, see A
WELL -REGULATED MILITIA, supra note 29, at 9–70. R
34. Senex, supra note 21; Scribble Scrabble, supra note 21. R
35. For a useful summary of these modalities of constitutional interpretation, see San-
ford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 643 (1989) (discussing
briefly the rhetorical structures of the right to bear arms).
36. TUCKER, supra note 13, at 60.  In the case of the Second Amendment, the preamble R
is essential to discovering the original understanding of this text. See David Thomas Konig,
The Second Amendment: A Missing Transatlantic Context for the Historical Meaning of “the Right of
the People to Keep and Bear Arms,” 22 LAW & HIST. REV. 119, 120 (2004).  Thus, Blackstone’s
rules directly contradict the suggestion of Eugene Volokh, that preambles were simply non-
binding justification clauses. See Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 793, 795 n.8 (1998).
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One of the key texts cited by Second Amendment originalists is
the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776.37  If one were to interpret the
meaning of bearing arms in that text according to Blackstonian rules,
one would need to compare the use of the phrase “bear arms” with
other occurrences of that phrase in the same text.38  The first occur-
rence of the term actually appears in a provision that exempted con-
scientious objectors from having to bear arms.  Because the
government could not force one to bear arms in self-defense, but only
in some types of militia-related activity, this use clearly fit the military
sense of the term.39  In this case, the Blackstonian method clearly
demonstrates that the individual-rights interpretation of the phrase
“bear arms” misrepresents the original understanding of the Penn-
sylvania Constitution.  There are other contextual clues in the Penn-
sylvania Constitution that lend additional support for interpreting the
phrase in its orthodox militia-based sense.  The right to bear arms was
paired with an attack on standing armies, another sign that the term
“bear arms” was understood to be a term synonymous with the use of
arms in some militia context.40  Finally, one would need to note the
fact that the Pennsylvania Constitution included a separate provision
on hunting, which provided additional evidence that civilian firearms
and military use of firearms were constitutionally distinct.41
37. Randy E. Barnett, Was the Right to Keep and Bear Arms Conditioned on Service in an
Organized Militia?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 237, 246–48 (2004) (reviewing H. RICHARD UVILLER &
WILLIAM G. MERKEL, THE MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO ARMS, OR, HOW THE SECOND AMEND-
MENT FELL SILENT (2002)); Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of
the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 222 (1983).  For a genuinely historical analysis
of the Pennsylvania Constitution’s arms-bearing provision that demonstrates that it was
originally understood in civic, not individual terms, see Nathan Ross Kozuskanich, “For the
Security and Protection of the Community:” The Frontier and the Makings of Penn-
sylvanian Constitutionalism (2005) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State Univer-
sity), available at www.ohiolink.edu/etd/send-pdf.cgi?osu1133196585.  On the nature of
eighteenth-century Pennsylvania radicalism and its anomalous character, see GORDON S.
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 226–37 (1969).
38. See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text. R
39. For a discussion of this important distinction, see Saul Cornell, The Early American
Origins of the Modern Gun Control Debate: The Right to Bear Arms, Firearms Regulation, and the
Lessons of History, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 571, 572–75 (2006).  The example of the
Quakers illustrates this point nicely.  Quakers were religious pacifists who were opposed to
bearing arms.  Bearing a gun, by contrast, was not a problem for Quakers who were not
vegetarians.  Although opposed to hunting for sport, Quakers accepted the use of firearms
in the context of hunting for subsistence. DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, ALBION’S SEED 554
(1989).
40. PA. CONST. of 1776, art. XIII.  The same juxtaposition of the right to bear arms and
the opposition to standing armies is also evident in the North Carolina Constitution, Ver-
mont Constitution, and Massachusetts Constitution.  For the text of these documents, see
SOURCE OF OUR LIBERTIES 356, 366, 376 (Richard L. Perry ed., 1978).
41. PA. CONST. of 1776, § 43.
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The persistence of Blackstonian theories of construction in the
post-constitutional era is equally clear.  One can see clear echoes of
this methodology in Aymette v. State, one of the most important ante-
bellum cases on the meaning of the right to bear arms.  Aymette was
charged with having a Bowie knife, a particularly lethal type of edged
weapon, hidden on his person.42  Rather than approach the case in
the manner suggested by modern plain-meaning originalists, the
judges in Aymette used Blackstonian contextualist methods.  Indeed,
the judges took a long historical detour to trace the history of the
right to bear arms back to the English struggle against standing ar-
mies.  The court asserted that the right preserved to the people was
done so that “they may as a body, rise up to defend their just rights,
and compel their rulers to respect the laws.”43  The court further
noted that the right had to be understood in terms of the grievances
that had prompted its inclusion into fundamental law, a clear echo of
Blackstonian method.  “The complaint was against the government.
The grievances to which they were forced to submit, were for the most
part of a public character, and could have been redressed only by the
people rising up for their common defence to vindicate their rights.”44
The court also adopted the orthodox understanding of the phrase
bearing arms:
A man in the pursuit of deer, elk, and buffaloes, might carry
his rifle every day, for forty years, and, yet, it would never be
said of him, that he had borne arms, much less could it be
42. Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 155 (1840).  On the importance of
Aymette, see JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF STATUTORY CRIMES 498
(1873), and The Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Private and Public Defence, 1 CENT. L.J. 259,
261 (John F. Dillon & Seymour D. Thompson eds., 1874).  The case was also cited by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939).  It is important to note
that no constitutional texts protect a right to have guns, but rather founding-era constitu-
tions talk about bearing arms, a term which included edged weapons as well.  Indeed,
edged weapons were part of the standard arms required by law for Minutemen in Massa-
chusetts, and would have enjoyed greater protection than handguns.  The one important
counter example would be a horseman’s pistol, which was standard equipment for cavalry
units.  For a good illustration of this, see An Act for Forming and Regulating the Militia
within the Colony of the Massachusetts-Bay, in New England, and for repealing all the Laws
heretofore made for that Purpose ch. 1, at 15–22 (1775); An Act for forming and regulat-
ing the Militia within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and for repealing all the Laws
heretofore made for that Purpose (March 3, 1781), Acts and laws of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, ch. XXI, at 32–43; Act for regulating and governing the Militia of the Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts, and for repealing all Laws heretofore made for that Purpose
(March 10, 1785), Acts and laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, ch. I, at 219–30.
There is little historical foundation for the claim that handguns would have enjoyed consti-
tutional protection in the founding era, apart from horsemen’s pistols.
43. Aymette, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) at 157.
44. Id.
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said, that a private citizen bears arms, because he has a dirk or
pistol concealed under his clothes, or a spear in a cane.45
To dispel any ambiguity, the court categorically asserted that the
right “does not mean for private defence [sic].”46
II. THE ANTI-FEDERALIST REVIVAL AND PLAIN-MEANING ORIGINALISM
One of the most remarkable changes in legal scholarship over the
last two decades has been the elevation of the Anti-Federalists within
the legal canon.47  Once dismissed as “men of little faith,” the Anti-
Federalists have risen from the ash heap of history to become the
“other Founders” of our constitutional tradition.48  While there is no
question that Anti-Federalism is essential to understanding the dy-
namics of the debate over the Constitution and the origins of the Bill
of Rights, this is not quite the same as treating them as if they were the
authors of  the Constitution or various provisions of the Bill of Rights.
No area in American constitutional law has been more effectively re-
cast in Anti-Federalist terms than the Second Amendment.49  To com-
45. Id. at 161.
46. Id. at 157.  Modern gun rights advocates and scholars routinely assert that all nine-
teenth-century commentators embraced the individual-rights view of the Second Amend-
ment.  David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 BYU L. REV.
1359, 1505 (1998).  In part, this anachronistic reading reflects the tendency of those in-
volved in the modern gun control debate to read the modern-collective/individual-rights
dichotomy back into the past.  If one simply reads authors such as Joseph Story historically,
it is clear that they viewed the Second Amendment within the context of the militia. See 3
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 83–95 (1833).
Indeed, Story lamented that rising individualism was slowly eroding popular support for
militia regulation which Story believed was essential to preserving the original spirit of the
Second Amendment. See Saul Cornell, St. George Tucker and the Second Amendment: Original
Understandings and Modern Misunderstandings, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1123, 1130–31 (2006)
(“Story shared Tucker’s view that the Second Amendment had been adopted to assuage
Anti-Federalists’ fears about the potential disarmament of the state militias.”).  After the
Civil War, Joel Prentiss Bishop also treated the Second Amendment in the context of the
militia. BISHOP, supra note 42, at 497. R
47. Saul A. Cornell, The Changing Historical Fortunes of the Anti-Federalists, 84 NW. U. L.
REV. 39, 40 (1990); Peter J. Smith, Sources of Federalism: An Empirical Analysis of the Court’s
Quest for Original Meaning, 52 UCLA L. REV. 217, 223 (2004).
48. On the idea of the Anti-Federalists as “men of little faith,” see MEN OF LITTLE
FAITH:  SELECTED WRITINGS OF CECELIA KENYON 31–67 (Stanley Elkins et al. eds., 2002).
For the view that the Anti-Federalists were in some sense, other Founders, see SAUL COR-
NELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM AND THE DISSENTING TRADITION IN AMERICA
1788–1828, at 1–15 (1999) [hereinafter THE OTHER FOUNDERS].  For the view that Anti-
Federalists were losers, see Paul Finkelman, Turning Losers into Winners: What Can We Learn,
If Anything, from the Antifederalists?, 79 TEX. L. REV. 849, 854–55 (2001) (reviewing THE
OTHER FOUNDERS, supra).
49. Paul Finkelman, “A Well-Regulated Militia”: The Second Amendment in Historical Perspec-
tive, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 195, 196–97 (2000); Jack N. Rakove, The Second Amendment: The
Highest Stage of Originalism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 103, 112–13 (2000).
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pound the irony of this turn to Anti-Federalist originalism, Second
Amendment revisionists have latched onto one of the most radical
Anti-Federalist texts: The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of
the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania to their Constituents.50
Quite apart from the fact that the Dissent gave voice to a radical
strain of Anti-Federalist constitutionalism, it is even more remarkable
that a theory of originalism purporting to be based on what the aver-
age rational man on the street believed would use a hastily-drafted
protest that was never copied by any other state ratification conven-
tion as the foundation for an argument about original meaning.  Not
only was the Dissent’s odd formulation of the right to bear arms not
copied by other state conventions, but its idiosyncratic usage was not
emulated by any major writer during ratification.  Indeed, the Dissent-
ers were so far out of step with mainstream thinking within their own
state that none of them won election to the First Congress that actu-
ally drafted the Bill of Rights.51  Rather than serve as a reference point
for orthodoxy, the Dissent functioned in almost exactly the opposite
way.  For those who sat in the First Congress its words were not taken
as some type of constitutional gold standard.  In fact, quite the oppo-
site was the case.  The Dissent was actually cited as an example of the
most extreme and radical Anti-Federalist demands.52  It was never in-
voked in the way modern gun rights supporters use it: as a text that
reflected the views of the typical rational man on the street.  Madison
did not even include it among various proposals he collected when he
began formulating his own list of possible amendments.53  Finally, one
must also acknowledge that its own authors later dismissed its ranting
as exaggerated and emotionally overwrought.54  Yet, despite the over-
whelming historical evidence that this text was not typical, or ulti-
mately influential, or even entirely rational, gun rights scholars insist
on using it as though it were dispositive of the meaning of the Second
Amendment.55  In essence, plain-meaning originalists have taken their
theory in the direction of an alternate history, science-fiction fantasy
in which the Anti-Federalist losers are miraculously transformed into
the authors of the Second Amendment.  One might as well argue that
50. The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of the State
of Pennsylvania to their Constituents (Dec. 18, 1787), reprinted in THE ORIGIN OF THE SEC-
OND AMENDMENT 154, 160 (David E. Young ed., 1991). See also Barnett, supra note 37, at R
246–48; Kates, supra note 37, at 222; Kopel, supra note 46, at 1406–07. R
51. Finkelman, supra note 49, at 206; Rakove, supra note 49, at 135. R
52. THE OTHER FOUNDERS, supra note 48, at 158. R
53. A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA, supra note 29, at 59. R
54. THE OTHER FOUNDERS, supra note 48, at 225. R
55. Barnett, supra note 37, at 246–48. R
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the Second Amendment was drafted by Daniel Shays, not James
Madison, a view consistent with the belief of modern gun rights sup-
porters that any body of armed citizens is a militia with a constitu-
tional right to take up arms against its government.56  The Founders
would have viewed this latter interpretation as a repudiation of their
constitutional ideals, not a vindication of them.  In their view an
armed mob was not a well-regulated militia.57
There is little question that the radical Anti-Federalist ideology in
the Dissent reflects an important minority voice from the founding era.
Nor is it surprising that modern originalist supporters of gun rights
would use these voices to attempt to construct a historical basis for a
modern libertarian vision of gun rights.  In that vein, scholar Randy
Barnett recently quoted a letter from a Maine Anti-Federalist to
George Thatcher, a Federalist representative serving in the First Con-
gress.58  In that letter the Anti-Federalist, Nasson, discussed guns in
terms quite similar to the Pennsylvania Dissenters.  Indeed, this letter
is one of the few texts from the founding era that frame the right to
keep arms outside of the context of bearing them in a well-regulated
militia.
I find that Ammendments [sic] are once again on the Car-
pet. I hope that such may take place as will be for the Best
Interest of the whole. A Bill of rights well secured that we the
people may know how far we may Proceade [sic] in Every
Department then their [sic] will be no Dispute Between the
people and rulers in that may be secured the right to keep
arms for Common and Extraordinary Occations [sic] such as
to secure ourselves against the wild Beast and also to amuse
us by fowling and for our Defence [sic] against a Common
Enemy.59
Interestingly, Barnett shows much more interest in the views of
Anti-Federalist Nasson than he does in the views of Federalist
Thatcher,60 even though Thatcher sat in the Congress that drafted the
Second Amendment.  This topsy-turvy method of establishing the
56. For a discussion of the genre of alternate history, and the use of Anti-Federalist
texts to conjure up an alternate history of the Second Amendment, see Saul Cornell, A New
Paradigm for the Second Amendment, 22 LAW & HIST. REV. 161, 164 (2004).
57. A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA, supra note 29, at 76–85. R
58. Barnett, supra note 37, at 252. R
59. Letter from Samuel Nasson to George Thatcher (July 9, 1789), in CREATING THE
BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 260–61
(Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991).
60. Barnett, supra note 37, at 252–54. R
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original understanding is typical of plain-meaning-originalist
methodology.
The question that ought to concern us is not how Nasson viewed
the right to bear arms, but how Thatcher viewed the scope and mean-
ing of this right.  This is especially true because Thatcher became a
respected jurist, served on both the Massachusetts and Maine Su-
preme Courts, and authored one of the most detailed examinations of
the right to bear arms in the founding era.  Writing under his favorite
pen name, Scribble Scrabble, Thatcher defined the scope of his own
state’s arms bearing provision:
The Bill of Rights secures to the people the use of arms in
common defense; so that, if it be an alienable right, one use
of arms is secured to the people against any law of the legisla-
ture. The other purposes for which they might have been
used in a state nature, being a natural right, and not surren-
dered by the constitution, the people still enjoy, and may
continue to do so till the legislature shall think fit to
interdict.61
The fact that Americans in the founding era made a decision to
elevate one particular class of arms used for one particular purpose to
the highest level of constitutional protection does not mean that civil-
ian guns enjoyed no other legal protection in the founding era.
Rather, it means that in the founding era civilian guns were treated
like any other type of property.  Thatcher’s conception of the right to
bear arms provides the clearest refutation of the gun-rights slogan that
there is no contemporary evidence from the founding era to support
the militia based view of the right to bear arms.
In the upside down world of originalism, the anomalous Penn-
sylvania Constitution of 1776 is more important than the more influ-
ential Massachusetts State Constitution of 1780. In this universe, the
rejected constitutional model of Pennsylvania becomes dispositive,
while the  document that became the future model for all subsequent
61. Scribble Scrabble, supra note 21.  For evidence of Thatcher’s authorship, see Letter R
from Christopher Gore to Rufus King (June 28, 1787), in 1 THE LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE
OF RUFUS KING 226 (Charles R. King ed., 1894).  These comments were made about the
Massachusetts Constitution’s provision on the right to keep and bear arms.  Gun rights
advocates both within and outside of the academy have long maintained that the militia-
based view of the right to bear arms is a modern invention. STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT
EVERY MAN BE ARMED 83 (1984); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second
Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461, 471–75 (1995).  The Massachusetts Constitution, the
most influential state constitution in the founding era, clearly does not fit the model of
gun advocates.  The fact that Thatcher was one of the framers of the Second Amendment
underscores the absurdity of the gun rights claim.
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constitutions, including the Federal Constitution, is ignored.  This er-
ror is compounded by the treatment of the legislative history of the
drafting of the Second Amendment. For Second Amendment
originalists, the voices of Anti-Federalists have effectively supplanted
the views of Federalists who actually sat in the First Congress that
wrote the Second Amendment.62
III. BEARING A GUN VS. BEARING ARMS
Although gun-rights originalists have been writing about the Sec-
ond Amendment for almost three decades, it is astonishing that they
have not been able to produce a significant body of sources to support
their claim that bearing arms was generally understood to include
both military and non-military uses of arms during the founding era.
The list of sources provided turns out to be rather small.  In addition
to the Dissent, plain-meaning originalists have cited a “Bill for the Pres-
ervation of Deer,” that Madison submitted while in the Virginia legis-
lature.63  The law penalized persons who “shall bear a gun out of his
inclosed [sic] ground, unless whilst performing military duty.”64 It
seems strange to use a law that does not even mention the phrase bear
arms to support a conclusion about what bear arms meant, but this
sort of sleight of hand has become common in Second Amendment
scholarship. What Madison’s bill demonstrates is that bearing a gun
had no military connotation.  One might bear a gun in pursuit of a
deer, but bearing a gun in a military context was identical to bearing
arms.  A careful reading of the Virginia game bill actually leads to the
opposite conclusion of the one suggested by individual-rights par-
tisans.  Indeed, this bill only underscores the point made by George
Thatcher: that the state clearly retained the right to regulate the use
of firearms and differentiated between the level of restrictions that
might be placed on bearing a gun and bearing arms.65
If one were truly interested in interpreting the Constitution ac-
cording to its original understanding, one would be better advised to
simply follow standard historical methods and abandon originalist
techniques entirely.  Ascertaining the influence of any historical text is
62. DONALD S. LUTZ, POPULAR CONSENT AND POPULAR CONTROL: WHIG POLITICAL THE-
ORY IN THE EARLY STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1980).
63. A Bill for Preservation of Deer (1785), in 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
443–44 (J. Boyd ed., 1950).
64. Id.
65. Id. The bill was introduced twice but the House took no action on it. Virginia had
enacted two earlier game laws, a 1738 law and another in 1772.  Strangely, Barnett argues
that this source proves that bearing arms included non-military use of arms despite the fact
that the phrase is never used in the source. See Barnett, supra note 37, at 245. R
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a complex historical undertaking.  Still, intellectual historians rou-
tinely engage in precisely this sort of enterprise, and originalists would
be well advised to follow their methodological precepts.66  Obviously,
the first step in such an inquiry must be to immerse oneself in the
sources.  Only after one has completed this arduous process is it possi-
ble to determine how a particular text such as the Dissent fits within
the intellectual universe of the founding era.  Rather than engage in
this arduous process, plain-meaning originalists have simply cherry-
picked quotes from disparate texts paying little heed to an author’s
intentions or influence.67  To determine if the Dissent’s use of the
term bear arms was standard or nonstandard, one would have to com-
pare its usage with other contemporary works in a comprehensive
manner.  Only once this task has been completed could one make any
meaningful claims about how its use of the phrase bear arms com-
pared to other contemporaneous sources.68
The methods of intellectual history that I have briefly described
are hardly the exclusive province of historians.  Indeed, Michael Dorf,
a leading constitutional scholar, systematically examined the use of
the phrase bear arms in congressional texts from the founding era.
Dorf’s conclusions are an important first step toward ascertaining
what this term meant in the founding era.  In every instance, Dorf
found that bear arms fit the military understanding of the term.  In
fact, Dorf found no evidence in these sources for the individual-rights
view.69
If one expands beyond the congressional documents examined
by Dorf, the evidence also vindicates the militia-based reading of the
phrase bear arms.  A survey of the press revealed more than one hun-
dred uses of this term in print sources from the period between the
Declaration of Independence and the adoption of the Second
66. For examples of the intellectual historians’ craft, see DAVID A. HOLLINGER, IN THE
AMERICAN PROVINCE: STUDIES IN THE HISTORY AND HISTORIOGRAPHY OF IDEAS (1985); LEO-
NARD KRIEGER, IDEAS AND EVENTS: PROFESSING HISTORY (1992); G. EDWARD WHITE,  TORT
LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY, at xi–xvi (1980).
67. Saul Cornell, “Don’t Know Much About History” The Current Crisis in Second Amendment
Scholarship, 29 N. KY. L. REV. 657, 681 (2002).
68. On the methodological breadth of modern intellectual history, see NEW DIREC-
TIONS IN AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY, at xi–xix (John Higham & Paul K. Conkin eds.,
1979), and ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN CULTURAL & INTELLECTUAL HISTORY (Mary Kupiec
Cayton & Peter W. Williams eds., 2001).
69. Michael C. Dorf, What Does the Second Amendment Mean Today?, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
291, 292 (2000).  Dorf took advantage of advances in digital searching in his research.
While digital searching can be useful, it ought not to be seen as a shortcut around the
arduous task of mastering the full body of primary sources surviving from the founding
era; Dorf’s findings were replicated by David Yassky, The Second Amendment: Structure, His-
tory, and Constitutional Change, 99 MICH. L. REV. 588, 597 (2000).
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Amendment.  Ninety-six percent of the texts in which this term was
used conformed to the military understanding of the term.70
Originalist supporters of the individual-rights thesis have never been
able to produce more than a handful of texts to support their
claims.71  Rather than cite dozens of texts, plain-meaning originalists
prefer to cite the same text dozens of times.  Needless, to say, one of
the texts they have endlessly recycled is the Anti-Federalist Dissent.
Until supporters of the individual-rights view can locate a comparable
body of evidence to the one produced by supporters of the militia-
based reading of the Second Amendment, then the issue of what bear-
ing arms meant ought to be viewed as settled as a matter of historical
fact.  The dominant understanding of the phrase bear arms in the
founding era, and therefore the understanding incorporated into the
Second Amendment, was indisputably the orthodox military one.  To
suggest otherwise, as many Second Amendment originalists have
done, is to engage in a form of sophistry that borders on intellectual
fraud.72
70. The figure was obtained by searching the Evans Early American imprints and news-
paper collections, which includes most of the major newspapers from the founding era and
all of the published books, broadsides, and pamphlets.  For a complete list of these occur-
rences, see Saul Cornell, Occurance and Usage of Bearing Arms in Books, Pamphlets, and Broad-
sides in the Evans Digital Collection, 1776–1791 (April 2007) (unpublished table, on file with
the Maryland Law Review).  For an effort to place the Dissent in its intellectual and political
context, see BEYOND THE FOUNDERS: NEW APPROACHES TO THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE
EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 251–73 (Jeffrey L. Pasley et al. eds., 2004).
71. For a discussion of this feature of Second Amendment originalism, see Rakove,
supra note 49, at 113–14. R
72. When faced with such overwhelming evidence, gun rights advocates sometimes fall
back on the word “keep,” noting that even if bear arms was widely understood to have a
military meaning then the word “keep” ought to be viewed as strictly private in nature.  Of
course there is no evidence of any constitutional text from the founding era affirming a
separate and distinct right to keep arms apart from the obligation to bear them in a well-
regulated militia.  Following the same logic one would have to conclude that the Constitu-
tion would allow cruel or unusual punishments, prohibiting only cruel and unusual pun-
ishments.  The effort to cleave keeping arms from bearing them is profoundly
anachronistic.  Founding-era militia statutes routinely required citizens to purchase their
own arms, which they were required to use to meet their legal obligation to participate in
the militia.  Thus, in practice, keeping arms was hardly ever divorced from the obligation
to bear them. Saul Cornell, Early American Gun Regulation and the Second Amendment: A Closer
Look at the Evidence, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. 197, 200, 202–03 (2007).  Another common his-
torical error in originalist scholarship stems from the conflation of the language of eight-
eenth-century constitutionalism with that of the Jacksonian Era.  The language of state
constitutionalism shifted in the early-nineteenth century.  Thus, Pennsylvania’s revolution-
ary-era Constitution affirmed a right of the people to bear arms in defense of themselves
and the state.  Mississippi’s Jacksonian Era Constitution employed a more individualistic
language affirming a right of each citizen to bear arms in defense of himself and the state.
If the earlier language had protected an individual right there would have been little need
to change it. On this point see Robert Weisberg, The Utilitarian and Deontological Entangle-
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IV. CONCLUSION
The examples cited above are not meant to provide an exhaustive
survey of American views of constitutional interpretation in the tumul-
tuous decades between the American Revolution and the rise of Jack-
sonian democracy.73  Nor can this evidence come close to capturing
the rich and deeply contested early history of the right to bear arms.74
Setting aside the normative questions about the value of originalism as
a method of constitutional interpretation, one thing seems clear: in its
current incarnation this methodology is deeply flawed.  Plain-meaning
originalism is inconsistent with many of the founding era’s own inter-
pretive principles.  Moreover, plain-meaning-originalism’s methodol-
ogy fails to meet the rigorous standards of serious historical inquiry.
In its current form, plain-meaning originalism is little more than an
intellectual fac¸ade for ideologically-driven scholarship.  Unless
originalists are willing to master and apply standard historical meth-
ods with some rigor, their methodology will never be much more than
the old law office history with a new coat of paint.
ment of Debating Guns, Crime, and Punishment in America, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 333, 338–45
(2004) (reviewing GUNS, CRIMES, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (Bernard E. Hardcourt ed.,
2003)).  Indeed, the debates in Jacksonian Era constitutional conventions clearly demon-
strate that Americans understood the difference between these two different formulations
of the right to bear arms.  On this shift, see A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA, supra note 29, at R
42.
73. The development of ratifier intent as the appropriate guide to constitutional inter-
pretation based on a compact theory of the union and robust theory of popular sover-
eignty clearly occurred in the Jeffersonian Era. See Lofgren, supra note 7, at 94–95; Powell, R
supra note 7, at 916. R
74. For a detailed discussion of this early history, see A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA, supra
note 29. R
